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Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture

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  • Pilar Socorro, M.

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  • Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:62:y:2007:i:1:p:76-97
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    1. Beath, John & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Ulph, David, 1998. "Organization Design and Information-Sharing in a Research Joint Venture with Spillovers," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 47-59, January.
    2. Radner, Roy, 1991. "Dynamic games in organization theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 217-260, July.
    3. Vislie, Jon, 1994. "Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 83-91, January.
    4. Picard Pierre & Rey Patrick, 1987. "Incentives in cooperative research and development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8739, CEPREMAP.
    5. Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993. "Coordinating research through research joint ventures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June.
    6. Katrien Kesteloot & Reinhilde Veugelers, 1995. "Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 651-672, December.
    7. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
    8. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
    9. Michael L. Katz & Janusz A. Ordover, 1990. "R&D Cooperation and Competition," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 137-203.
    10. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-577, August.
    11. Richard E. Romano, 1989. "Aspects of R&D Subsidization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 863-873.
    12. HEGE, Ulrich & HAUSWALD, Robert, 2002. "Ownership and control in joint ventures: theory and evidence," HEC Research Papers Series 750, HEC Paris.
    13. Stenbacka, Rune & Tombak, Mihkel M., 1998. "Technology policy and the organization of R&D," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 503-520, September.
    14. Morasch, Karl, 1995. "Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, September.
    15. Choi, Jay Pil, 1992. "Cooperative R&D with moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 485-491, August.
    16. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1985. "Tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in Sweden," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 331-353, August.
    17. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tao, Zhigang, 1998. "Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 391-413, December.
    18. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    19. Leyden, Dennis Patrick & Link, Albert N., 1999. "Federal laboratories as research partners," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-592, May.
    20. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, April.
    21. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
    22. Tripsas, Mary & Schrader, Stephan & Sobrero, Maurizio, 1995. "Discouraging opportunistic behavior in collaborative R & D: A new role for government," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 367-389, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Niesten, Eva & Jolink, Albert, 2012. "Regulating opportunism in the electricity industry and consumer interests," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 38-45.
    2. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Subsidizing research programs with "if" and "when" uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1605, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    3. Inês Teixeira & Aurora Teixeira & Luís Santos, 2023. "R&D subsidies and Portuguese firms’ performance: A longitudinal firm-level study," GEE Papers 0173, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos, Ministério da Economia, revised Jul 2023.
    4. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Working Papers 2014.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Gamal Atallah, 2014. "Conditional R&D subsidies," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 179-214, March.
    6. M. Pilar Socorro & Gines de Rus, 2010. "The effectiveness of the Spanish urban transport contracts in terms of incentives," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(9), pages 913-916.
    7. Duch, Néstor & Montolio, Daniel & Mediavilla , Mauro, 2009. "Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a two-stage quasi-experimental approach," INVESTIGACIONES REGIONALES - Journal of REGIONAL RESEARCH, Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, issue 16, pages 143-165.
    8. de Rus, Gines & Socorro, M. Pilar, 2006. "La financiacion del transporte urbano y metropolitano desde los presupuestos generales del Estado [Urban and metropolitan public transport financing from state budget]," MPRA Paper 11998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2013. "Innovation and waste in supply chain management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 191-199.
    10. Antonio Sánchez Soliño, 2012. "Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 201(2), pages 67-91, June.

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