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Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture

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  • Pilar Socorro, M.

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  • Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:62:y:2007:i:1:p:76-97
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    1. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tao, Zhigang, 1998. "Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 391-413, December.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
    3. Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993. "Coordinating research through research joint ventures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June.
    4. Beath, John & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Ulph, David, 1998. "Organization Design and Information-Sharing in a Research Joint Venture with Spillovers," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 47-59, January.
    5. Leyden, Dennis Patrick & Link, Albert N., 1999. "Federal laboratories as research partners," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-592, May.
    6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-577, August.
    7. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
    8. HEGE, Ulrich & HAUSWALD, Robert, 2002. "Ownership and control in joint ventures: theory and evidence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 750, HEC Paris.
    9. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
    10. Stenbacka, Rune & Tombak, Mihkel M., 1998. "Technology policy and the organization of R&D," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 503-520, September.
    11. Radner, Roy, 1991. "Dynamic games in organization theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 217-260, July.
    12. Morasch, Karl, 1995. "Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, September.
    13. Vislie, Jon, 1994. "Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 83-91, January.
    14. Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
    15. Tripsas, Mary & Schrader, Stephan & Sobrero, Maurizio, 1995. "Discouraging opportunistic behavior in collaborative R & D: A new role for government," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 367-389, May.
    16. Choi, Jay Pil, 1992. "Cooperative R&D with moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 485-491, August.
    17. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1985. "Tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in Sweden," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 331-353, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Duch, Néstor & Montolio, Daniel & Mediavilla , Mauro, 2009. "Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a two-stage quasi-experimental approach," INVESTIGACIONES REGIONALES - Journal of REGIONAL RESEARCH, Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, issue 16, pages 143-165.
    2. de Rus, Gines & Socorro, M. Pilar, 2006. "La financiacion del transporte urbano y metropolitano desde los presupuestos generales del Estado
      [Urban and metropolitan public transport financing from state budget]
      ," MPRA Paper 11998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Niesten, Eva & Jolink, Albert, 2012. "Regulating opportunism in the electricity industry and consumer interests," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 38-45.
    4. Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2013. "Innovation and waste in supply chain management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 191-199.
    5. Besanko, David & Tong, Jian & Wu, Jianjun, 2016. "Subsidizing research programs with "if" and "when" uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1605, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Working Papers 2014.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Antonio Sánchez Soliño, 2012. "Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 201(2), pages 67-91, June.

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