IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v39y1992i4p485-491.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperative R&D with moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Choi, Jay Pil

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Choi, Jay Pil, 1992. "Cooperative R&D with moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 485-491, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:39:y:1992:i:4:p:485-491
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(92)90190-A
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Karbowski, Adam, 2015. "Problemy dzielenia się wiedzą w poziomej współpracy badawczo-rozwojowej [Problems of knowledge sharing in horizontal R&D cooperation]," MPRA Paper 69602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Niedermayer, Andras & Wu, Jianjun, 2013. "Breaking up a research consortium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 342-353.
    3. Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2014. "Incomplete information and R&D organization," MPRA Paper 59205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jay Pil Choi, 2002. "A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 203-229, August.
    5. Silipo, Damiano B., 2008. "Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 101-119, June.
    6. Bornemann, Tobias, 2018. "Do transfer pricing rules distort R&D investment decisions?," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 233, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    7. Kabiraj, Tarun & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti, 2014. "Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information," MPRA Paper 59259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Severinov,S., 1999. "On information sharing and incentives in R&D," Working papers 26, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    9. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti, 2015. "Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests," MPRA Paper 62114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. David Rietzke, 2015. "Push or pull? Grants, prizes and information," Working Papers 82851479, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    11. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2023. "Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative R&D under Uncertain Probability of Success," MPRA Paper 117623, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Karbowski, Adam, 2016. "Strategiczne znaczenie kosztu stałego ustanowienia współpracy badawczo-rozwojowej przedsiębiorstw [Strategic meaning of the fixed set-up cost of R&D cooperation]," MPRA Paper 73603, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Rittwik Chatterjee & Srobonti Chattopadhyay, 2015. "Collaborative Research and Rate of Interests," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 3(2), pages 140-157, December.
    14. Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
    15. Niedermayer, Andras & Wu, Jianjun, 2013. "Breaking Up a Research Consortium," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 433, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    16. Anbarci, Nejat & Lemke, Robert & Roy, Santanu, 2002. "Inter-firm complementarities in R&D: a re-examination of the relative performance of joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 191-213, February.
    17. M. Pilar Socorro, 2003. "Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 570.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:39:y:1992:i:4:p:485-491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.