Coordinating research through research joint ventures
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- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, .
"Incentives and incomplete information,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Picard Pierre, 1986.
"On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1979.
"Market Structure and Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-77, August.
- Picard Pierre & Rey Patrick, 1987. "Incentives in cooperative research and development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8739, CEPREMAP.
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