Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams
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- Berglöf, Erik & Burkart, Mike & Friebel, Guido & Paltseva, Elena, 2012.
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- Jan Y. Sand, 2009. "Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 57-70.
- Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
- Mauricio S. Bugarin, 2015. "Efficiency in a Monotonic Partnership with Investment: An Endogenous Implementation of Holmstromâ€™s Principal," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 4(3), pages 127-135, September.
- M. Pilar Socorro, 2003. "Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 570.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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