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Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Sánchez Soliño

    (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid)

Abstract

En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo basado en la teoría de los incentivos para analizar la asignación optima de los riesgos en los contratos de infraestructuras y servicios públicos, en un entorno de información asimétrica entre principal (Administración Pública) y agente (socio privado), y de aversión al riesgo de este ultimo. La principal conclusión del trabajo es que, en un contrato optimo, la transferencia del riesgo de demanda al socio privado será mayor, frente al riesgo de disponibilidad, en la medida en que tengan mayor incidencia aquellas dimensiones de la calidad del servicio que puedan ser observadas por los usuarios pero no verificadas por la Administración. Clasificación JEL: D82, H54, H57, L97.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Sánchez Soliño, 2012. "Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 201(2), pages 67-91, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2012:v:201:i:2:p:67-91
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentivos; riesgo de demanda; riesgo de disponibilidad; contratación pública; servicios públicos.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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