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Optimización de la transferencia de riesgos en los Contratos de Infraestructuras y Servicios Públicos

  • Antonio Sánchez Soliño

    ()

    (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid)

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    En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo basado en la teoría de los incentivos para analizar la asignación optima de los riesgos en los contratos de infraestructuras y servicios públicos, en un entorno de información asimétrica entre principal (Administración Pública) y agente (socio privado), y de aversión al riesgo de este ultimo. La principal conclusión del trabajo es que, en un contrato optimo, la transferencia del riesgo de demanda al socio privado será mayor, frente al riesgo de disponibilidad, en la medida en que tengan mayor incidencia aquellas dimensiones de la calidad del servicio que puedan ser observadas por los usuarios pero no verificadas por la Administración. Clasificación JEL: D82, H54, H57, L97.

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    Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Review of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 201 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 67-91

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    Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2012:v:201:i:2:p:67-91
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    1. Arrow, K J & Radner, R, 1979. "Allocation of Resources in Large Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 361-85, March.
    2. Pilar Socorro, M., 2007. "Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 76-97, January.
    3. Olivier Debande, 2002. "Private Financing of Transport Infrastructure: An Assessment of the UK Experience," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 36(3), pages 355-387, September.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    6. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2011. "The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector," Chapters, in: A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 29 Edward Elgar.
    7. Juan J. Dolado & José M. González-Páramo & José Viñals, 1997. "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability in Spain," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 9728, Banco de Espa�a.
    8. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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