Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public-private partnerships
The construction and provision of infrastructure services such as transport nowadays is often based on a partnership between three main actors: public sector, private sector and multilateral lenders, under a framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). This type of partnership has been employed in a wide range of projects in the transport sector and in various contexts in developing and developed countries. Given this observation, the objective of this paper is to examine how countries' economic and political characteristics contribute to the success of PPPs in transport investments. Special focus in the analysis is given to how the perception of corruption and democratic accountability may influence the success of a PPP project in different transport sectors. We examine a database with 856 transport PPP projects using a generalized linear model in the form of a logit model in order to evaluate the transport database covering data from 72 countries, classified in six regions. The study highlights the importance of national experience. Not only does national macroeconomic experience appear to have a relevant role, but so also does its past experience (either positive or negative) of transport PPP projects. An interesting finding from the analysis is the importance of the rest of the world's perception of a country's level of corruption and democratic accountability for the final outcome of a PPP project.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/620614/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002.
"Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services,"
Economics and Finance Discussion Papers
02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Bennett, John & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2006. "Building and managing facilities for public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2143-2160, November.
- Bennett, John & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 22, Royal Economic Society.
- JOhn Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2005. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/137, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2004. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Public Policy Discussion Papers 02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Butkiewicz, James L. & Yanikkaya, Halit, 2005. "The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 371-391, March.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
- Sirtaine, Sophie & Pinglo, Maria Elena & Guasch, J. Luis & Foster, Vivien, 2005. "How profitable are private infrastructure concessions in Latin America?: Empirical evidence and regulatory implications," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 380-402, May.
- Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
- Grout, Paul A, 1997. "The Economics of the Private Finance Initiative," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 53-66, Winter.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2000.
"Incentives and Political Economy,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780198294245, March.
- Oliver Hart, 2003.
"Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March.
- Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dailami, Mansoor & Klein, Michael, 1998. "Government support to private infrastructure projects in emerging markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1868, The World Bank.
- Etienne B. Yehoue & Mona Hammami & Jean-FranÃ§ois Ruhashyankiko, 2006. "Determinants of Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure," IMF Working Papers 06/99, International Monetary Fund.
- Valila, Timo, 2005. "How expensive are cost savings? On the economics of public-private partnerships," EIB Papers 4/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:102-109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.