IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Transport Pricing and Public-Private Partnerships

  • Roger Vickerman

    ()

  • Emil Evenhuis

Public-Private Partnerships have become a favoured way of introducing private capital into transport projects whilst maintaining an element of public interest. This paper considers the potential conflicts that might arise between the freedom of the private operator within a PPP and other elements of the public sector’s transport policy. Specifically it tackles the question of the problems that might arise when the public sector wishes to implement a type of price regulation, for example SMC Pricing, which might appear to limit the freedom of the private interest to maximise its value from the PPP according to the contract. The paper demonstrates theoretically the potential inconsistencies between such policies and suggest ways in which they may be overcome. We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/1004.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 1004.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1004
Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
Phone: +44 (0)1227 827497
Web page: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/

Order Information: Email:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tracey Girling)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.