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Symmetrical Research Joint Ventures: Cooperative Substitutes and Complements

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  • Neary, Peter
  • Leahy, Dermot

Abstract

We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we explore the implications of our results for the comparison between research joint ventures and a non-cooperative equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Neary, Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2004. "Symmetrical Research Joint Ventures: Cooperative Substitutes and Complements," CEPR Discussion Papers 4497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4497
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    Cited by:

    1. Tommaso Valletti & Hans Zenger, 2021. "Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 179-212, February.
    2. Inés Macho‐Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 785-816, December.
    3. Federico, Giulio & Langus, Gregor & Valletti, Tommaso, 2018. "Horizontal mergers and product innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-23.
    4. Dermot Leahy & Alireza Naghavi, 2010. "Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 633-649, September.
    5. Antonio Tesoriere, 2015. "Competing R&D joint ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 115(3), pages 231-256, July.
    6. Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2006. "Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs. Joint Ventures," Working Papers 2006.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Thanh Le & Cuong Le Van, 2016. "Trade Liberalisation and Optimal R&D Policies in a Model of Exporting Firms Conducting Process Innovation," Post-Print halshs-01314650, HAL.
    8. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2016. "Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 179-188.
    9. Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2008. "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 017, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    10. Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2014. "Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 15-25.
    11. Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré, 2009. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-42, December.
    12. Silipo, Damiano B., 2008. "Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 101-119, June.
    13. Giammario Impullitti, 2007. "International Schumpeterian Competition and Optimal R&D subsidies," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/55, European University Institute.
    14. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J. Peter, 2007. "Absorptive capacity, R&D spillovers, and public policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1089-1108, October.
    15. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 166524, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    16. Thanh Le & Cuong Le Van, 2014. "Trade Liberalization and Optimal R&D Policies with Process Innovation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01130413, HAL.
    17. Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2011. "Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities?," Working Papers 1128, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    18. Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2009. "Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition Policy," Working Papers 0910, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    19. Federico, Giulio & Langus, Gregor & Valletti, Tommaso, 2018. "Reprint of: Horizontal mergers and product innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 590-612.
    20. Dermot Leahy & J. Neary, 2009. "Multilateral subsidy games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(1), pages 41-66, October.
    21. Haaland, Jan I. & Kind, Hans Jarle, 2008. "R&D policies, trade and process innovation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 170-187, January.
    22. Meza, Sergio & Tombak, Mihkel, 2009. "Endogenous location leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 687-707, November.

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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