Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?
We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Publication status:||Published in Working paper GATE 2011-28. 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639471|
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