R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers
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- Désiré Vencatachellum & Bruno Versaevel, 2006. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," Post-Print halshs-00142520, HAL.
- Bruno Versaevel & Désiré Vencatachellum, 2006. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," Working Papers 0610, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Atallah, G., 2000. "Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," Cahiers de recherche 2000-16, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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- Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Symeonidis, George, 2003. "Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product R&D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 39-55, January.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2017. "One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," MPRA Paper 76903, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Evans, Shane, 2010. "Innovation contracts with leakage through licensing," Working Papers 10282, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, revised 05 Oct 2010.
- Noriaki Matsushima & Koki Arai & Ikuo Ishibashi & Fumio Sensui, 2011. "The effects of non-assertion of patents provisions: R&D incentives in vertical relationships," ISER Discussion Paper 0807, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2011.
"Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities?,"
1128, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2011. "Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?," Post-Print halshs-00639471, HAL.
- Alain-Désiré Nimubona & Hassan Benchekroun, 2014. "Environmental R&D in the Presence of an Eco-Industry," Working Papers 1406, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2014.
More about this item
KeywordsResearch and development; externalities; common agency.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-11-25 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-11-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2006-11-25 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2006-11-25 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2006-11-25 (Microeconomics)
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