IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information Sharing, Research Co-Ordination and Membership of Research Joint Ventures


  • Barba Navaretti, Giorgio
  • Bussoli, Patrizia
  • Ulph, David
  • von Graevenitz, Georg


This Paper examines which firms from a heterogeneous pool are more likely to join together and form a research joint venture (RJV). It differs from previous contributions as it introduces a set of realistic hypothesis on the characteristics of research co-operation and information sharing. Research paths can be substitute or complementary. This affects the nature of and consequently the gains from co-operation. The model shows that gains from co-operation are likely to be larger in the second case, as the probability of making a discovery is higher. This Paper also assumes that firms do not share information voluntarily if they do not co-operate only when the firms’ products are substitute. If the firms’ products are complementary there may be gains in sharing information also under non co-operation. This eliminates the gains from co-operation arising from information sharing. If this is the case, RJVs are more likely to be formed between firms producing substitute products. If we combine these two results we have the prediction that firms co-operate in research when they produce substitute products and when they follow complementary research paths. The empirical analysis carried out on a sample of European RJVs confirms and supports this prediction. The model also carefully explores the role of asymmetries in costs between the two firms. It shows that larger initial asymmetries reduce the information-sharing gains from RJV-formation but increase the research co-ordination gains. This result is supported by the empirical analysis, which shows that gains from RJV formation are largest for intermediate levels of asymmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Barba Navaretti, Giorgio & Bussoli, Patrizia & Ulph, David & von Graevenitz, Georg, 2002. "Information Sharing, Research Co-Ordination and Membership of Research Joint Ventures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3134

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:23 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Ulph, David, 1998. "Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 333-357, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-24, CIRANO.
    2. Horváth, Márton & Hau-Horváth, Orsolya, 2014. "A földrajzi közelség szerepe az innovációs együttműködésekben - illúzió vagy valós tényező?. Szakirodalmi áttekintés
      [The role of geographical proximity in efforts to cooperate on innovation - illu
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1419-1446.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.