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Opportunism, Trust and Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

    (CREAM - Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

  • Shyama V. Ramani

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

Even when there is a potential danger of opportunism, economic agents often initiate contracts or engage in trust. Considering a world with two types of agents, opportunists and non-opportunists, interacting under incomplete information, this article develops a simple two-stage game theoretic model to show how trust and cooperation can emerge in a one-shot interaction, even in the absence of a supporting incentive mechanism. Two classic paradigms are considered: the prisoner's dilemma and the game of chicken. In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, trust depends on the exogenous probability of having a non-opportunist partner, while in the game of chicken trust is purely a function of the payoffs. Contrary to intuition, a high ratio of non-opportunistic agents in the population does not favor contract initiation in the game of chicken and a strong presence of opportunists does not act as an impediment to respecting commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama V. Ramani, 2016. "Opportunism, Trust and Cooperation," Post-Print hal-02088730, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02088730
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077391
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    3. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Cooperation: The Power Of A Single Word? Some Experimental Evidence On Wording And Gender Effects In A Game Of Chicken," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 43-64, January.
    4. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    5. Olivia Macovei, 2020. "Conceptual Delimitations related to the Philosophical Approaches on Synthetic Biology," Logos Universalitate Mentalitate Educatie Noutate - Sectiunea Filosofie si Stiinte umaniste/ Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty - Section: Philosophy and Humanistic Sciences, Editura Lumen, Department of Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 83-104, December.

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