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Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

    (CREAM - Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

  • Shyama V. Ramani

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Abstract

The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama V. Ramani, 2004. "Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination," Post-Print hal-02088766, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02088766
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-3673-7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    2. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    3. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846.
      • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Shyama Ramani, 2011. "R&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 373-394, September.
    5. Owen, Ann L. & Videras, Julio, 2008. "Trust, cooperation, and implementation of sustainability programs: The case of Local Agenda 21," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 259-272, December.
    6. Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Ramani, Shyama V., 2008. "R&D cooperation, asymmetric technological capabilities and rationale for technology parks," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 11/08, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    7. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama V. Ramani, 2007. "Opportunism, Trust and Cooperation," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(2), pages 203-228, May.
    8. Liu, Ting & Quan, Lei & Gao, Xing, 2023. "Social dishonesty and corporate green innovation," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 967-985.

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