Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations
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- Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 293, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Gani Aldashev & Marini Marco & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01109513, HAL.
- Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Brothers in Alms? Coordination Betwen Nonprofits on Markets for Donations," Working Papers 1406, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Gani Aldashev & Marco A. Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-02, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2016. "Information, competition, and the quality of charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 64-77.
- Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2017.
"Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects,"
6/17, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
- Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-12, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 11931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gani Aldashev & Cecilia Navarra, 2017. "Development NGOs: Basic Facts," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-36, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:96:y:2017:i:c:p:48-61 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsNonprofits; Charitable giving; Coordination; Endogenous coalition formation; Non-distribution constraint;
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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