IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/11931.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects

Author

Listed:
  • Verdier, Thierry
  • Aldashev, Gani
  • Marini, Marco

Abstract

We build a model with non-governmental organizations competing through fundraising for donations and choosing their project types. Donors’ willingness to give differs across project types. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the larger donation market or to monopolize the smaller one. The resulting equilibrium configuration crucially depends on the asymmetry in potential donation market size and on donors’ perceived substitutability or complementarity between giving to two different projects. We analyze the welfare properties of the decentralized equilibrum and characterize the conditions under which such equilibrium is inefficient. We also develop a variant of the model with inter-temporal choices of NGOs, analyze settings where NGOs can coordinate their fundraising activities and/or project type choices, extend the model to allow for spillovers between NGO fundraising activities, and illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Verdier, Thierry & Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 11931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11931
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP11931
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donkers, Bas & van Diepen, Merel & Franses, Philip Hans, 2017. "Do charities get more when they ask more often? Evidence from a unique field experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 58-65.
    2. Christina M. Fong & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2009. "What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 64-87, April.
    3. Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, 1978. "Advertising and Welfare," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, Spring.
    4. Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2014. "Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 182-200.
    5. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Brilon, Stefanie, 2014. "Anti-social behavior in profit and nonprofit organizations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 149-161.
    6. Astrid SIMILON, 2015. "Self-Regulation Systems for NPO Coordination: Strenghts and Weaknesses of Label and Umbrella Mechanisms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 89-104, March.
    7. Gani ALDASHEV & Cecilia NAVARRA, 2018. "Development Ngos: Basic Facts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 125-155, March.
    8. Gani Aldashev & Esteban Jaimovich & Thierry Verdier, 2018. "Small is Beautiful: Motivational Allocation in the Nonprofit Sector," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 730-780.
    9. Eric Werker & Faisal Z. Ahmed, 2008. "What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 73-92, Spring.
    10. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2001. "Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1343-1372.
    11. Gauri, Varun & Galef, Julia, 2005. "NGOs in Bangladesh: Activities, resources, and governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 2045-2065, December.
    12. Aldashev, Gani & Verdier, Thierry, 2010. "Goodwill bazaar: NGO competition and giving to development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 48-63, January.
    13. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    14. Ronelle Burger & Indraneel Dasgupta & Trudy Owens, 2015. "A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(1), pages 71-111.
    15. Scharf, Kimberley, 2014. "Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 50-57.
    16. Gilles Nancy & Boriana Yontcheva, 2006. "Does NGO Aid Go to the Poor? Empirical Evidence from Europe," IMF Working Papers 2006/039, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Aldashev, Gani & Verdier, Thierry, 2009. "When NGOs go global: Competition on international markets for development donations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 198-210, November.
    18. Reinstein David A, 2011. "Does One Charitable Contribution Come at the Expense of Another?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-54, June.
    19. Anna Fruttero & Varun Gauri, 2005. "The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location Decisions in Rural Bangladesh," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(5), pages 759-787.
    20. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01109513 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Heyes, Anthony & Martin, Steve, 2015. "NGO mission design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-210.
    22. Abigail Barr & Marcel Fafchamps, 2006. "A client-community assessment of the NGO sector in Uganda," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(4), pages 611-639.
    23. repec:aeg:report:2014-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Robinson, Mark & Riddell, Roger C., 1995. "Non-Governmental Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198233305.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kopel, Michael & Marini, Marco A., 2022. "Mandatory disclosure of managerial contracts in NGOs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 65-85.
    2. Vallino, Elena & Aldahsev,Gani, 2013. "NGOs and participatory conservation in developing countries: why are there inefficiencies?," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201318, University of Turin.
    3. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2020. "Mandatory Disclosure of Managerial Contracts in Nonprofit Organizations," Working Papers 2020.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Aldashev, Gani & Vallino, Elena, 2019. "The dilemma of NGOs and participatory conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-1.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2020. "Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1541-1582.
    2. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:125-155 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gani ALDASHEV & Cecilia NAVARRA, 2018. "Development Ngos: Basic Facts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 125-155, March.
    4. Koch, Dirk-Jan & Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2009. "Keeping a Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 902-918, May.
    5. Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2014. "Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 182-200.
    6. Faraz Usmani & Marc Jeuland & Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, 2018. "NGOs and the effectiveness of interventions," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-59, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Ester Manna, 2023. "Bad NGOs? Competition in the market for donations and workers' misconduct," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/457, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Canh Thien Dang & Trudy Owens, 2024. "Non-governmental organizations’ motivation to diversify: self-interest or operation-related? Evidence from Uganda," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 561-584.
    9. Federica VIGANO & Andrea SALUSTRI, 2015. "Matching profit and Non-profit Needs: How NPOs and Cooperative Contribute to Growth in Time of Crisis. A Quantitative Approach," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 157-178, March.
    10. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2023. "Inter-charity competition under spatial differentiation: Sorting, crowding, and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 457-468.
    11. Vallino, Elena & Aldahsev,Gani, 2013. "NGOs and participatory conservation in developing countries: why are there inefficiencies?," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201318, University of Turin.
    12. Gani Aldashev & Esteban Jaimovich & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralised Public Good Provision," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(654), pages 2085-2109.
    13. Morales, Joaquin & Serfilippi, Elena, 2017. "When NGOs fail: A model of advocacy and services provision in weak democracies," MPRA Paper 91506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Cecilia NAVARRA & Elena VALLINO, 2015. "Who Had the Idea to Build Up a Village Organization? Some Evidence from Senegal and Burkina Faso," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 33-72, March.
    15. Poret, Sylvaine, 2019. "Label wars: Competition among NGOs as sustainability standard setters," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 1-18.
    16. Amihai Glazer & Rune Jansen Hagen & Jørn Rattsø, 2018. "Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 302-321, May.
    17. Dang, Canh Thien & Owens, Trudy, 2024. "Non-governmental organizations’ motivation to diversify:: self-interest or operation-related? Evidence from Uganda," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120200, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Andreas Fuchs & Hannes Öhler, 2021. "Does private aid follow the flag? An empirical analysis of humanitarian assistance," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 671-705, March.
    19. Joaquín Morales Belpair, 2016. "Decentralized aid and democracy," Investigación & Desarrollo, Universidad Privada Boliviana, vol. 2(1), pages 5-17.
    20. Aldashev, Gani & Vallino, Elena, 2019. "The dilemma of NGOs and participatory conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-1.
    21. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Verwimp, Philip, 2022. "Pro-social behavior after a disaster: Evidence from a storm hitting an open-air festival," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 493-510.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-governmental organizations; Fundraising; Foreign aid; Clustering;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11931. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.