IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00754327.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

When NGOs go global: Competition on international markets for development donations

Author

Listed:
  • Gani Aldashev

    (FUNDP - Fondation Universitaire Notre Dame de la Paix - Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, CRED - Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters - Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters)

  • Thierry Verdier

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, University of Southampton - University of Southampton [Southampton], CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)

Abstract

Why are many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing in fundraising. We find that NGOs become multinational if the economies of scale in fundraising are sufficiently large. In that case, national NGOs in the smaller country disappear, while some national NGOs remain in the larger country only if country sizes are sufficiently different. Social welfare is higher in the regime with multinationals than under autarky.

Suggested Citation

  • Gani Aldashev & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "When NGOs go global: Competition on international markets for development donations," Post-Print halshs-00754327, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754327
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.07.007
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754327
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1984. "Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 63-81.
    2. Eric Werker & Faisal Z. Ahmed, 2008. "What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 73-92, Spring.
    3. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    4. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    5. Krugman, Paul R., 1979. "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-479, November.
    6. Anna Fruttero & Varun Gauri, 2005. "The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location Decisions in Rural Bangladesh," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(5), pages 759-787.
    7. Barr, Abigail & Fafchamps, Marcel & Owens, Trudy, 2005. "The governance of non-governmental organizations in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 657-679, April.
    8. James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, 2003. "Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 792-812, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lionel Fontagné & Michela Limardi, 2011. "The Outcome of NGOs' Activism in Developing Countries under Visibility Constraint," PSE Working Papers halshs-00630096, HAL.
    2. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," Working Papers 6/17, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    3. Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2014. "Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 182-200.
    4. Federica VIGANO & Andrea SALUSTRI, 2015. "Matching profit and Non-profit Needs: How NPOs and Cooperative Contribute to Growth in Time of Crisis. A Quantitative Approach," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 157-178, March.
    5. Gani Aldashev & Cecilia Navarra, 2017. "Development NGOs: Basic Facts," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-36, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Krautheim, Sebastian & Verdier, Thierry, 2012. "Globalization, Credence Goods and International Civil Society," CEPR Discussion Papers 9232, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger & Baptiste Venet, 2017. "Mission Drift in Microcredit and Microfinance Institution Incentives," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2017-02, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    8. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00630096 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Astrid SIMILON, 2015. "Self-Regulation Systems for NPO Coordination: Strenghts and Weaknesses of Label and Umbrella Mechanisms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 89-104, March.
    10. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Philip Verwimp, 2016. "Pro-social behavior after a disaster: parochial or universal? Evidence from a natural experiment in Belgium," Working Papers CEB 16-054, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    11. Aldashev, Gani & Marini, Marco & Verdier, Thierry, 2010. "Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 8109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Stefan Mann, 2016. "Governing complementary responsibility goods through hybrid systems in a globalizing world," Journal of Socio-Economics in Agriculture (Until 2015: Yearbook of Socioeconomics in Agriculture), Swiss Society for Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, vol. 9(1), pages 14-21.
    13. repec:aeg:report:2014-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Krautheim, Sebastian & Verdier, Thierry, 2016. "Offshoring with endogenous NGO activism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 22-41.
    15. Aldashev, Gani & Limardi, Michela & Verdier, Thierry, 2015. "Watchdogs of the Invisible Hand: NGO monitoring and industry equilibrium," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 28-42.
    16. Anthony Heyes & Marcel Oestreich, 2017. "The Optimal NGO Chief: Strategic Delegation in Social Advocacy," Working Papers 1701, Brock University, Department of Economics.
    17. Philipp Herkenhoff & Sebastian Krautheim, 2018. "The International Organization of Production in the Regulatory Void," CESifo Working Paper Series 6922, CESifo Group Munich.
    18. Michela Limardi, 2011. "The Ambiguous Outcome of NGOs' Activism in Developing Countries," ERSA conference papers ersa11p555, European Regional Science Association.
    19. repec:bpj:nonpfo:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:9:n:6 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Lionel Fontagné & Michela Limardi, 2011. "The Outcome of NGOs' Activism in Developing Countries under Visibility Constraint," Working Papers halshs-00630096, HAL.
    21. Cecilia NAVARRA & Elena VALLINO, 2015. "Who Had the Idea to Build Up a Village Organization? Some Evidence from Senegal and Burkina Faso," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 33-72, March.
    22. Gani Aldashev & Michela Limardi & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "Watchdogs of the Invisible Hand: NGO Monitoring, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Industry Equilibrium," Working Papers 1404, University of Namur, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-governmental organizations; Charitable giving; Fundraising; Globalization; Multinational firms;

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.