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Impure Prosocial Motivation in Charity Provision: Warm-Glow Charities and Implications for Public Funding

  • Kimberley Ann Scharf

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-11/cesifo1_wp4479.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4479.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4479
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