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Can private giving promote economic segregation?

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  • Horstmann, Ignatius J.
  • Scharf, Kimberley
  • Slivinski, Al

Abstract

This Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.
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Suggested Citation

  • Horstmann, Ignatius J. & Scharf, Kimberley & Slivinski, Al, 2007. "Can private giving promote economic segregation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1095-1118, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:5-6:p:1095-1118
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    2. Andreoni, James & Bergstrom, Ted, 1996. "Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(3-4), pages 295-308, September.
    3. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    4. IgnatiusJ. Horstmann & KimberleyA. Scharf, 2008. "A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 427-453, March.
    5. Roberts, Russell D, 1987. "Financing Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(2), pages 420-437, April.
    6. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    7. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
    8. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    9. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Scharf, Kimberley, 2014. "Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 50-57.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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