IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v161y2014i1p1-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Ornstein

    ()

  • Robert Norman

Abstract

It has long been recognized that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) suffers from a defect known as nonmonotonicity, wherein increasing support for a candidate among a subset of voters may adversely affect that candidate’s election outcome. The expected frequency of this type of behavior, however, remains an open and important question, and limited access to detailed election data makes it difficult to resolve empirically. In this paper, we develop a spatial model of voting behavior to approach the question theoretically. We conclude that monotonicity failures in three-candidate IRV elections may be much more prevalent than widely presumed (results suggest a lower bound estimate of 15 % for competitive elections). In light of these results, those seeking to implement a fairer multi-candidate election system should be wary of adopting IRV. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Ornstein & Robert Norman, 2014. "Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 1-9, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:1-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0118-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-013-0118-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:02:p:263-281_05 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lepelley, Dominique & Chantreuil, Frederic & Berg, Sven, 1996. "The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 133-146, June.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    4. Lawrence Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, 2005. "Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 439-462, June.
    5. Donald Horowitz, 2004. "The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 507-517, February.
    6. Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman, 2004. "A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 487-506, February.
    7. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:04:p:929-937_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1052-x is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Marek M. Kaminski, 2015. "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 20, pages 367-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0465-5 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting theory; Instant Runoff Voting; Agent-based modeling; Monotonicity; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:1-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.