IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v47y2011i4p545-553.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension

Author

Listed:
  • Azrieli, Yaron

Abstract

Recent works on political competition incorporate a valence dimension to the standard spatial model. The goal of this paper is to axiomatize rankings of candidates by voters that are consistent with Euclidean preferences on the policy space and an additive valence dimension. Specifically, we consider the case where only the ideal point in the policy space and the ranking over candidates are known for each voter. We characterize the case where there are policies x1,…,xm for m candidates and numbers v1,…,vm representing valence scores, such that a voter with an ideal policy y ranks the candidates according to vi−‖xi−y‖2.

Suggested Citation

  • Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:545-553
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.07.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440681100070X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.07.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "Political competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 249-271.
    2. Arianna Degan, 2007. "Candidate Valence: Evidence From Consecutive Presidential Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 457-482, May.
    3. Itzhak Gilboa & D. Schmeidler, 2003. "Expected Utility in the Context of a Game," Post-Print hal-00752136, HAL.
    4. ,, 2010. "Rationalizable voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(1), January.
    5. Gilboa,Itzhak & Schmeidler,David, 2001. "A Theory of Case-Based Decisions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521802345, January.
    6. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
    7. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Foundations of spatial preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 200-205, March.
    8. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "Categorization generated by prototypes -- an axiomatic approach," Game Theory and Information 0405003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:18:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    11. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
    12. Degan, Arianna & Merlo, Antonio, 2009. "Do voters vote ideologically?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1868-1894, September.
    13. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Laslier, Jean-Francois, 2007. "Euclidean preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 87-98, February.
    14. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
    15. Navin Kartik & R. Preston McAfee, 2007. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 852-870, June.
    16. Knoblauch, Vicki, 2010. "Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-5, January.
    17. Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2008. "Context-dependent voting and political ambiguity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 565-581, April.
    18. Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.
    19. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 172-182, July.
    20. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    21. Kwang-ho Kim, 2005. "Valence characteristics and entry of a third party," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-9.
    22. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
    23. Jäger, Gerhard & Koch-Metzger, Lars & Riedel, Frank, 2011. "Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 420, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    24. Gersbach, Hans, 1998. "Communication skills and competition for donors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-18, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, 2020. "Spherical preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    2. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins & Élise F. Tchouante, 2022. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 301-316, March.
    3. Yuichiro Kamada Jr. & Fuhito Kojima Jr., 2014. "Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 203-236, November.
    4. Patrick H. O'Callaghan, 2019. "Second-order Inductive Inference: an axiomatic approach," Papers 1904.02934, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Characterization of multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension," MPRA Paper 14513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 121-130.
    3. Fabian Gouret, 2021. "Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 177-226, September.
    4. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 341-359, September.
    5. Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifié, 2013. "Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing The Spatial Voting Model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 650-666, June.
    6. Michael K Miller, 2011. "Seizing the mantle of change: Modeling candidate quality as effectiveness instead of valence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 52-68, January.
    7. Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, 2020. "Spherical preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    8. Fabian Gouret & Stéphane Rossignol, 2019. "Intensity valence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 63-112, June.
    9. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Imperfectly Informed Voters And Strategic Extremism," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 439-471, May.
    10. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Foundations of spatial preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 200-205, March.
    11. Fabian Gouret & Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2011. "An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 309-340, July.
    12. Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2008. "An Alternative Approach to Valence Advantage in Spatial Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 441-454, June.
    13. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-16.
    14. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2018. "A Reform Dilemma in polarized democracies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 148-158.
    15. Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber & Alexei Zakharov, 2019. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 713-753, September.
    16. Gallego, Maria & Schofield, Norman, 2017. "Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 160-181.
    17. Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.
    18. Drouvelis, Michalis & Saporiti, Alejandro & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2014. "Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 86-115.
    19. Hummel, Patrick, 2010. "On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 425-445, November.
    20. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:545-553. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.