This note is devoted to the question: How restrictive is the assumption that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is proven that a preference profile with I individuals and A alternatives can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d dimensions if and only if d=min(I,A-1). The paper also describes the systems of A points which allow for the representation of any profile over A alternatives, and provides some results when only strict preferences are considered.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
- Brams, S. J. & Jones, M. A. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001.
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01-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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- Jeffrey Milyo, 1999.
"A Problem with Euclidean Preferences in Spatial Models of Politics,"
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
9920, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Milyo, Jeffrey, 2000. "A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 179-182, February.
- Philippe De Donder, 2000. "Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 601-627.
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