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Rationalizable voting

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  • ,

    (Department of Political Science, University of Rochester)

Abstract

When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that admit a (quasi)concave utility representation? I derive necessary and sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the hypothesis that the voter has preferences represented by a concave utility function is observationally equivalent to the hypothesis that she has preferences represented by a quasiconcave utility function, I obtain testable restrictions on the location of voter ideal points, and I apply the conditions to the problem of predicting future voting decisions. Without knowledge of the location of the voting alternatives, voting decisions by multiple voters impose no joint testable restrictions on the location of their ideal points, even in one dimension. Furthermore, the voting records of any group of voters can always be embedded in a two-dimensional space with strictly concave utility representations and arbitrary ideal points for the voters. The analysis readily generalizes to choice situations over general finite budget sets.

Suggested Citation

  • ,, 2010. "Rationalizable voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(1), January.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:425
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Henry & Ismael Mourifié, 2013. "Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing The Spatial Voting Model," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 650-666, June.
    2. Andrei Gomberg, 2011. "Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules," Working Papers 1102, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    3. Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
    4. Heufer, Jan, 2013. "Quasiconcave preferences on the probability simplex: A nonparametric analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 21-30.
    5. , P. & ,, 2014. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    6. Andrei Gomberg, 2018. "Revealed votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 281-296, August.
    7. Nikolaos Argyris & Alec Morton & José Rui Figueira, 2014. "CUT: A Multicriteria Approach for Concavifiable Preferences," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 633-642, June.
    8. Jinhui H. Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2013. "Revealed Political Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1085-1115, November.
    9. Mikhail Freer & César Martinelli, 2023. "An algebraic approach to revealed preference," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 717-742, April.
    10. Hiroki Nishimura & Efe A. Ok & John K.-H. Quah, 2017. "A Comprehensive Approach to Revealed Preference Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1239-1263, April.
    11. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Foundations of spatial preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 200-205, March.
    12. Brian Duricy, 2023. "Preferences on Ranked-Choice Ballots," Papers 2301.02697, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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