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Axioms of Revealed Preference for Nonlinear Choice Sets

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  • Matzkin, Rosa L

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  • Matzkin, Rosa L, 1991. "Axioms of Revealed Preference for Nonlinear Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1779-1786, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:6:p:1779-86
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 395-409.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1089-1122.
    4. Gustavo E. Rodriguez, 2000. "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 413-432.
    5. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1997. "Efficient Wage Dispersion," CEPR Discussion Papers 1572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 83-114.
    8. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 395-409.
    9. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 861-889.
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