Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules
In this paper I consider choice correspondences defined on an extended domain: the decisions are assumed to be taken not by individuals, but by committees and, in addition to the budget sets, committee composition is observable and variable. For the case of varying committees choosing over a fixed set of two alternatives I provide a full characterization of committee choice structures that may be rationalized with sincere scoring. For the general case of multiple alternatives a necessary implication of choice by sincere scoring is provided.
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