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On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium

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  • James Enelow
  • Melvin Hinisch

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  • James Enelow & Melvin Hinisch, 1983. "On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 317-321, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:40:y:1983:i:3:p:317-321
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00114527
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    2. Slutsky, Steven, 1979. "Equilibrium under a-Majority Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1113-1125, September.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1976. "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 1172-1184, December.
    5. Paul B. Simpson, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(3), pages 478-490.
    6. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
    7. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Jackson, 2014. "Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 197-218, April.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle, 1986. "The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 135-178, January.
    3. Søren Serritzlew, 2005. "The Perverse Effect of Spending Caps," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 75-105, January.
    4. Nicholas R. Miller & Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, 1989. "The Geometry of Majority Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(4), pages 379-406, October.
    5. Kim Border, 1984. "An impossibility theorem for spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 293-305, January.
    6. John Chamberlin, 1986. "Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 295-313, January.
    7. Scott de Marchi, 1999. "Adaptive Models and Electoral Instability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 393-419, July.
    8. Nicholas R. Miller, 2015. "The spatial model of social choice and voting," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 10, pages 163-181, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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