Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation and, if so, constructs one. This result has electoral and mechanism design applications.
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