Recognizing One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profiles
A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation and, if so, constructs one. This result has electoral and mechanism design applications.
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- Anna Bogomolnaïa & Jean-François Laslier, 2004.
- Miguel Ángel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2006.
"A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences,"
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- Laslier, J.F., 1995. "Multivariate Analysis of Comparison Matrices," Papers 9504, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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