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Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment

  • Marcin Dziubinski

    ()

  • Jaideep Roy

    ()

We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to slect (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We characterise and give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distributions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point on the ideology space whcih we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our anlysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or differentiation) seems to be an important equlibrium feature.

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File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/342719/CEDI_08-19.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 08-19.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:08-19
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  1. Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "Political competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 249-271.
  3. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
  4. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
  5. Hummel, Patrick, 2010. "On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 425-445, November.
  6. Garrett Beeler Asay, 2008. "How does ideology matter in the spatial model of voting?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 109-123, June.
  7. Steven Callander, 2008. "Political Motivations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 671-697.
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