The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Dominique Lepelley & Frederic Chantreuil & Sven Berg, 1996. "The likehood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections," Post-Print hal-01600172, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
- Lepelley, Dominique, 1993. "On the probability of electing the Condorcet," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 105-116, February.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
- Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0476-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1069-1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Joseph Ornstein & Robert Norman, 2014. "Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 1-9, October.
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:89:y:2017:i:c:p:70-82 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016.
"Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections,"
AccessEcon, vol. 36(3), pages 1722-1728.
- Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016. "Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections," Post-Print hal-01452550, HAL.
- Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2018.
"Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 1-33, January.
- Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2018. "Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules," Post-Print hal-01697627, HAL.
- repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0465-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9580-z is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:31:y:1996:i:3:p:133-146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.