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Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making

Listed author(s):
  • Susumu Cato

    ()

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    This paper examines an extended framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We consider two classes of values: consequential values and non-consequential values. Each individual has a comprehensive preference based on the two. Non-consequential values are assumed to be homogeneous among individuals. It is shown that a social ordering function satisfying Arrovian conditions must be non-consequential: a social comprehensive preference gives unequivocal priority to non-consequential values. We clarify the role of common preferences over non-consequential features. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3
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    Article provided by Springer & Society for Economic Design in its journal Review of Economic Design.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 265-287

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:18:y:2014:i:4:p:265-287
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Web page: https://sites.google.com/site/societyforeconomicdesign/

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

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    1. Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2001. "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 423-436, December.
    2. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April.
    3. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2004. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 249-278, February.
    4. Suzumura, Kotaro & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a478, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.
    7. Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 2004. "Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(1), pages 237-251, 02.
    8. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-558, September.
    9. Kelsey, David, 1987. "The Role of Information in Social Welfare Judgements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 301-317, June.
    10. Marc Fleurbaey & Bertil Tungodden & Howard F. Chang, 2003. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1382-1386, December.
    11. Toyotaka Sakai & Masaki Shimoji, 2006. "Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 435-445, June.
    12. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 869-889, October.
    13. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-1572, October.
    14. Reiko Gotoh & Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2005. "Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 21-41.
    15. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2001. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 281-286, April.
    16. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
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