On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights
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KeywordsExtended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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