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On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights

Author

Listed:
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
  • 鈴村, 興太郎
  • スズムラ, コウタロウ
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • 吉原, 直毅
  • ヨシハラ, ナオキ

Abstract

An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial conferment of individual rights. This framework captures the intuitive conception of decision-making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. The model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the first stage, the society decides on the game-form rights to be promulgated. In the second stage, the promulgated game form rights, coupled with the revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determine a fully-fledged game, the play of which determines a culmination outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a social choice procedure, which can choose a game form in the first stage that is not only liberal, but also uniformly applicable to every revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, is identified.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzumura, Kotaro & 鈴村, 興太郎 & スズムラ, コウタロウ & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2006. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a478, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a478
    Note: This version February 14, 2006
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/13449/DP478.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Hees, Martin, 1999. "Liberalism, Efficiency, and Stability: Some Possibility Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 294-309, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 265-287, December.
    3. Ngo Long & Vincent Martinet, 2018. "Combining rights and welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 35-64, January.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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