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Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result

Author

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  • Enrico Guzzini

    (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy)

Abstract

This paper shows an impossibility result similar to the liberal paradox concerning two games, each of one with an efficient Nash equilibrium. We show that our result holds also in dictatorial games.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00583
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liberal paradox; efficient Nash equilibrium; Pareto principle; dictatorial games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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