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Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result

Author

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  • Enrico Guzzini

    () (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy)

Abstract

This paper shows an impossibility result similar to the liberal paradox concerning two games, each of one with an efficient Nash equilibrium. We show that our result holds also in dictatorial games.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00583
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
    2. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    4. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-245, August.
    5. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, pages 194-212.
    6. Suzumura, Kotaro & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a478, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Sen, Amartya, 1992. "Minimal Liberty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 139-159, May.
    8. Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Individual Rights Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, pages 161-177.
    9. Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January.
    10. Fine, Ben, 1975. "Individual Liberalism in a Paretian Society," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1277-1281, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liberal paradox; efficient Nash equilibrium; Pareto principle; dictatorial games;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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