On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights
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- Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
- Ngo Long & Vincent Martinet, 2018.
"Combining rights and welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 35-64, January.
- Ngo Van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: A New Approach to Intertemporal Evaluation of Social Alternatives," CESifo Working Paper Series 3746, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ngo Van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: A New Approach to Intertemporal Evaluation of Social Alternatives," Cahiers de recherche 01-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ngo van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2017. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives," Working Papers 2017.18, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
- Vincent Martinet & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Susumu Cato, 2014. "Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 265-287, December.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsExtended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-02-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2009-02-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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