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Negative Freedom And The Liberal Paradoxes

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  • Martin van Hees

Abstract

In their game-theoretic formulations, the liberal paradoxes of Amartya Sen and Alan Gibbard show a tension between freedom on the one hand, and Pareto optimality and stability on the other. This article examines what happens to the liberal paradoxes if a negative conception of freedom is used. Given a game-theoretic definition of negative freedom, it is shown, first, that the liberal paradoxes disappear in this new context: there are game forms in which individuals have a minimal amount of negative freedom and which guarantee the existence of Pareto-optimal and stable outcomes. Furthermore, if a game form gives each individual a maximal amount of negative freedom, the Pareto optimality of each stable outcome of the corresponding game is guaranteed. However, many games that provide such maximal negative freedom do not contain stable outcomes. We show that the liberal paradox may reappear in the mixed extension of such games.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin van Hees, 2000. "Negative Freedom And The Liberal Paradoxes," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(3), pages 335-352, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:335-352
    DOI: 10.1177/104346300012003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
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    3. van Hees, Martin, 1999. "Liberalism, Efficiency, and Stability: Some Possibility Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 294-309, October.
    4. Sugden, Robert, 1985. "Liberty, Preference, and Choice," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 213-229, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Keith Dowding, 2004. "Social Choice and the Grammar of Rights and Freedoms," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(1), pages 144-161, March.

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