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Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?

  • Éric Langlais

This paper discusses three issues. What do we know about criminals? attitude towards risk ? How could we represent their preferences? What are the implications for public policies in the area of crime deterrence? Classification JEL : D81, K42.

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Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 61 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 263-280

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_612_0263
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