Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism
This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 2005.
"Multi_profile welfarism: a generalization,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 227-228, October.
- Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2004. "Multi-Profile Welfarism : A Generalisation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 710, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Mongin, P., .
"Harsanyi's aggregation theorem: multi-profile version and unsettled questions,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1153, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mongin, Ph., 1991. "Harsanyi's aggregation theorem: multi-profile version and unsettled questions," CORE Discussion Papers 1991036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1127-35, September.
- Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September.
- Charles BLACKORBY & David DONALDSON & John A. WEYMARK, 1990.
"A Welfarist Proof of Arrow's Theorem,"
Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain)
1990031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Weymark, John A., 1998. "Welfarism on economic domains1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 251-268, December.
- Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2002. "Utilitarianism and the theory of justice," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 543-596 Elsevier.
- Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-72, October.
- Kelsey, David, 1987. "The Role of Information in Social Welfare Judgements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 301-17, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:707. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helen Neal)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.