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A Welfarist Proof of Arrow's Theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Charles BLACKORBY

    (University of British Columbia)

  • David DONALDSON

    (University of British Columbia)

  • John A. WEYMARK

    (University of British Columbia)

Abstract

This article presents a proof of Arrow's Theorem which highlights the theorem's relationship to welfarism and which emphasizes its underlying geometric structure. In addition, this method of proof is adapted to provide a proof of a single-preference-profile version of Arrow's Theorem. The relationship between Arrovian social choice theory and Bergson-Samuelson welfare economics is also considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles BLACKORBY & David DONALDSON & John A. WEYMARK, 1990. "A Welfarist Proof of Arrow's Theorem," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1990031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1990031
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 2005. "Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(2), pages 253-267, April.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541 Elsevier.
    3. Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 2006. "Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 279-287, October.
    4. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Business Journals, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
    5. Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2002. "A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 587-611.
    6. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem for state-contingent alternatives1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 365-387, November.
    7. BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2002. "In Defense of Welfarism," Cahiers de recherche 2002-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    8. John A. Weymark, 2017. "Conundrums for nonconsequentialists," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 269-294, February.
    9. Weymark, John A., 1998. "Welfarism on economic domains1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 251-268, December.
    10. François Maniquet, 2004. "On the equivalence between welfarism and equality of opportunity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 127-147, August.
    11. repec:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1083-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. John A Weymark, 2012. "Social Welfare Functions," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers vuecon-sub-13-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    14. Michael Morreau & John A Weymark, 2015. "Measurement Scales and Welfarist Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 15-00008, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    15. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.

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