A Welfarist Proof of Arrow's Theorem
This article presents a proof of Arrow's Theorem which highlights the theorem's relationship to welfarism and which emphasizes its underlying geometric structure. In addition, this method of proof is adapted to provide a proof of a single-preference-profile version of Arrow's Theorem. The relationship between Arrovian social choice theory and Bergson-Samuelson welfare economics is also considered.
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