A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice
We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Social Choice and Welfare (2002), 19: 587-611|
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- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
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90a12, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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- Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 271-306.
- Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1995.
"The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules,"
Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva
95.01, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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