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Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

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  • Herrade Igersheim

    (CEPERC - Centre d'EPistémologie et d'ERgologie Comparatives - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This note shows that results similar to Arrow's ImpossibilityTheorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by aweaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) tostate another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our resultstrengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfaristinformation into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," Post-Print halshs-00332792, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00332792
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreu Mas-Colell & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 39(2), pages 185-192.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, October.
    3. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    5. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, October.
    6. Donald G. Saari, 1998. "Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 239-261.
    7. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective choice; Arrow's Impossibility Theorem; weak Pareto principle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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