Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence
We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identiÖed by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.
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- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "Weak independence and veto power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 183-189, February.
- Josep E. Peris & BegoÓa Subiza, 1999.
"Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
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- Blau, Julian H, 1971. "Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 413-420, November.
- Campbell, Donald E., 1976. "Democratic preference functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 259-272, April.
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2007. "Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 69-82, July.
- I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
- Nick Baigent & Christian Klamler, 2003. "Transitive closure, proximity and intransitivities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(1), pages 175-181, December.
- Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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