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Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence

Author

Listed:
  • Ceyhun Coban

    (Department of Economics,Washington University in St. Louis)

  • Remzi Sanver

    (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract

We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identiÖed by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ceyhun Coban & Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence," Working Papers 201005, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:msc:wpaper:201005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2007. "Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 69-82, July.
    2. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "Weak independence and veto power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 183-189, February.
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    5. Georges Bordes, 1976. "Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 451-457.
    6. Deb, Rajat, 1977. "On Schwartz's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 103-110, October.
    7. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    8. Vincenzo DenicolÔ, 1998. "Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 563-566.
    9. Blau, Julian H, 1971. "Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 413-420, November.
    10. Campbell, Donald E., 1976. "Democratic preference functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 259-272, April.
    11. Nick Baigent & Christian Klamler, 2003. "Transitive closure, proximity and intransitivities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(1), pages 175-181, December.
    12. Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
    13. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cato, Susumu, 2015. "Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 59-61.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2016. "Weak independence and the Pareto principle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 295-314, August.

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