Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence
We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identiÖed by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.
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