Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
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Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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- Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:69-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
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