The Political Economy Of International Financial Institutions’ Lending To Pakistan
This paper analyzes the determinants of multilateral aid from international financial institutions (IFIs) to Pakistan, focusing on the world three major IFIs, the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. Political economic factors, notably bureaucratic interests and major shareholders economic interests, are suspected to be relevant in international aid allocation decisions. Pooled Tobit estimation analyses confirm this hypothesis. Although recipient need also proves to be a relevant determinant of lending, bureaucratic interest outranks the former. Among the main multilateral donors, the IDA and the ADB are shown to be more bureaucratic and stakeholders economic interest-oriented in their lending decisions than the IBRD and the IMF, which tend to adhere to official lending explanations.
|Date of creation:||10 Jan 2006|
|Date of revision:||01 Dec 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Pakistan Economic and Social Review 44.2(2006): pp. 155-180|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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