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Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule

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Abstract

Various Condorcet consistent social choice functions based on majority rule (tournament solutions) are considered in the general case, when ties are allowed: the core, the weak and strong top cycle sets, versions of the uncovered and minimal weakly stable sets, the uncaptured set, the untrapped set, classes of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets. The main focus of the paper is to construct a unified matrix-vector representation of a tournament solution in order to get a convenient algorithm for its calculation. New versions of some solutions are also proposed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

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  • Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2013. "Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 737-756, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jglopt:v:56:y:2013:i:2:p:737-756
    DOI: 10.1007/s10898-012-9907-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Subochev, Andrey & Zakhlebin, Igor, 2014. "Alternative versions of the global competitive industrial performance ranking constructed by methods from social choice theory," MPRA Paper 67462, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Fuad Aleskerov & Sergey Shvydun, 2019. "Allocation of Disputable Zones in the Arctic Region," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 11-42, February.
    3. Subochev, A., 2016. "How Different Are the Existing Ratings of Russian Economic Journals and How to Unify Them?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 181-192.
    4. Fuad T. Aleskerov & Vladimir V. Pislyakov & Andrey N. Subochev, 2014. "Ranking Journals In Economics, Management And Political Science By Social Choice Theory Methods," HSE Working papers WP BRP 27/STI/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Aleskerov, F., 2013. "Game-Theoretic Modeling: An Attempt of Brief Discussion and a Forecast of Development," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 181-184.
    6. Scott Moser, 2015. "Majority rule and tournament solutions," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 6, pages 83-101, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Subochev, Andrey & Aleskerov, Fuad & Pislyakov, Vladimir, 2018. "Ranking journals using social choice theory methods: A novel approach in bibliometrics," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 416-429.

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