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Dominant, weakly stable, uncovered sets: properties and extensions

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  • Subochev, Andrey

Abstract

Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set, two versions of the minimal weakly stable sets, the uncaptured set, the untrapped set, the minimal undominated set (strong top cycle) and the minimal dominant set (weak top cycle). The main results presented are the following. A criterion to determine whether an alternative belongs to a minimal weakly stable set is found. It establishes the logical connection between minimal weakly stable sets and covering relation. In tournaments and in general case it is determined for all twelve sets, whether each two of them are related by inclusion or not. In tournaments the concept of stability is employed to generalize the notions of weakly stable and uncovered sets. New concepts of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets are introduced and their properties and mutual relations are explored. A concept of the minimal dominant set is generalized. It helps to establish that in general case all dominant sets are ordered by strict inclusion. In tournaments the hierarchies of the classes of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets combined with the system of dominant sets constitute tournament’s structure (“microstructure” and “macrostructure” respectively). This internal structure may be treated as a system of reference, which is based on difference in degrees of stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Subochev, Andrey, 2008. "Dominant, weakly stable, uncovered sets: properties and extensions," MPRA Paper 53421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53421
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53421/1/MPRA_paper_53421.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Duggan, 2007. "A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 491-506, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2013. "Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 737-756, June.
    2. Subochev, Andrey & Zakhlebin, Igor, 2014. "Alternative versions of the global competitive industrial performance ranking constructed by methods from social choice theory," MPRA Paper 67462, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Fuad Aleskerov & Andrey Subochev, 2016. "Matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts," Papers 1607.02378, arXiv.org.
    4. Subochev, A., 2016. "How Different Are the Existing Ratings of Russian Economic Journals and How to Unify Them?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 181-192.
    5. Subochev, Andrey & Aleskerov, Fuad & Pislyakov, Vladimir, 2018. "Ranking journals using social choice theory methods: A novel approach in bibliometrics," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 416-429.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social choice; choice function; majority relation; tournament solution; Condorcet winner; core; top cycle; uncovered set; weakly stable set; externally stable set; uncaptured set; untrapped set; k-stable alternative; k-stable set; ranking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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