A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Andrikopoulos, Athanasios, 2009. "Characterization of the Generalized Top-Choice Assumption (Smith) set," MPRA Paper 14897, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Athanasios Andrikopoulos, 2012. "On the construction of non-empty choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 305-323, February.
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