IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice

  • Estelle Cantillon
  • Antonio Rangel

We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/9007/1/Cantillon-Rangel-2002.pdf
Download Restriction: only accessible to specific communities

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/9007.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (2002) v.19 n° 3,p.587-611
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9007
Contact details of provider: Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Blackorby, C. & Donaldson, D. & Weymark, J.A., 1990. "A Welfarist Proof Of Arrow'S Theorem," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 90a12, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  2. Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
  3. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
  4. Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 271-306.
  5. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.