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Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

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  • Ugur Ozdemir
  • M. Sanver

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  • Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:61-76
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, August.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    3. William Vickrey, 1960. "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 74(4), pages 507-535.
    4. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.
    2. Ceyhun Coban & M. Sanver, 2014. "Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 953-961, December.
    3. Kutlu, Levent, 2007. "Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 151-154, November.
    4. Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March.
    5. Kruger, Justin & Remzi Sanver, M., 2018. "Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 32-34.
    6. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 257-260, December.
    7. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 563-575, October.
    8. Roy, Souvik & Storcken, Ton, 2019. "A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 46-55.

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