IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Limits of acyclic voting

Listed author(s):
  • Duggan, John
Registered author(s):

    Assuming three or more alternatives, there is no systematic rule for aggregating individual preferences that satisfies acyclicity and the standard independence and Pareto axioms, that avoids making some voter a weak dictator, and that is minimally responsive to changes in voter preferences. The latter axiom requires that a preference reversal in the same direction by roughly one third of all voters is sufficient to break social indifference. This result substantially strengthens classical acyclicity theorems of Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972) and Schwartz (1986). When the set of alternatives is large, cycles become intuitively easier to construct, the acyclicity axiom has greater bite, and the responsiveness threshold can be increased to two less than the number of individuals, which yields the weakest logically possible responsiveness axiom.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116000259
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 163 (2016)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 658-683

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:658-683
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.004
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Andreu Mas-Colell & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 185-192.
    2. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August.
    3. Deb, Rajat, 1981. "k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 899-909, June.
    4. Blair, Douglas H. & Bordes, Georges & Kelly, Jerry S. & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1976. "Impossibility theorems without collective rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 361-379, December.
    5. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2011. "Chapter Seventeen - Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 191-299 Elsevier.
    6. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:658-683. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.