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The reach of social choice theory

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  • Amartya Sen

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  • Amartya Sen, 2012. "The reach of social choice theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 259-272, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:259-272 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0613-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marilda Sotomayor, 2008. "The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 621-640, March.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
    3. Kojima Fuhito, 2007. "When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, September.
    4. Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Manipulation via capacities revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 302-311, July.
    5. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 701-720.
    6. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, pages 237-239.
    7. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May.
    8. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    9. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2014. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 624-630.
    10. Ayşe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2009. "Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 383-403, September.
    11. Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Sebastian Gallegos, 2010. "Public-Private Wage Gap In Latin America (1999-2007): A Matching Approach," Documentos de Trabajo 268, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    12. Hideo Konishi & M. Ünver, 2006. "Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 3-24, August.
    13. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    14. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
    15. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
    16. Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December.
    17. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
    18. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 169-202, June.
    2. Bajmócy, Zoltán & Málovics, György & Juhász, Judit & Gébert, Judit, 2015. "Szegénység, képességek, lehetőségek. Szegénységkezelési szempontok Amartya Sen elméletének tükrében
      [A framework for poverty reduction based on the capability approach]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 544-564.

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