Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
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- H. Reiju Mihara, 1996. "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics 9604002, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lauwers, Luc & Van Liedekerke, Luc, 1995. "Ultraproducts and aggregation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 217-237.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 257-276.
- Kari Saukkonen, 2007. "Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 637-647, June.
- Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008.
"Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February.
- Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2006. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," MPRA Paper 437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Torres, Ricard, 2005. "Limiting Dictatorial rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 913-935, November.
- Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004.
- H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004.
- repec:spr:etbull:v:6:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-017-0129-0 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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